Response to "The Implausability of Satan"

Response to Implausibility of Satan

This submission, by Mr. Ronald Morales, a self professed "liberal Christian", is a response to my Implausibility of Satan paper. I will probably write a response to Mr. Morales at some point, but do not have the time at this moment.

Response to Implausibility of Satan

By Ronald Morales

Hello. I enjoy your site. I always appreciate people open to both challenging beliefs as well as accepting challenges to their beliefs. In my humble opinion, there are far too many ideologues intolerant to challenges to their respective ‘faith”.

Myself, I’m a Christian. I’d probably be considered a “liberal Christian”, as opposed to, say, a fundamentalist Christian. I noted that you say your background is logic. Mine is as well, so I thought I could address some of your contributions from that shared perspective.

This submission addresses your article on the plausibility of the existence of Satan. Personally, I don’t particularly see any reason as a Christian that I should accept “Satan” as a literal person as opposed to, say, a metaphor for the temptations of evil. You seem to be coming from the perspective of critiquing a doctrine of Satan as a literal person. Though again I don’t necessarily accept Satan as a literal person, I wanted to evaluate the validity of your arguments against the plausibility of such a being. I’ll be addressing your points in a point-by-point format:

You ask “How is it possible that God--from whom only good things come--created a supernatural being that turned evil?” You appear to make an invalid inference. Even if everything that God makes is good, it doesn’t follow that everything that God makes must remain good, particularly if one of the things God makes is a being that has the ability to choose to turn evil. Hence, Satan could begin as good (particularly if having free will is a good thing to God), with the power (freedom if you will) to choose evil over good, just like humans do, but then chooses to be evil.

As to Matthew 7:18, that passage is in the context of a discussion of Christian followers doing good things. Even if you apply the same principle to God, the same analysis as the above could again be applied. Though God produces only good things (as a good tree produces only good fruit), some of those good things God produces are free willed beings (such as Satan) with the power to choose to do evil. So there’s no inconsistency with God producing an initially good thing that has the power and freedom to do (or even choose to become) evil, and then in fact chooses to be evil.

Let’s assume that God, being omniscient, knew when he created Satan that he would choose to become and do evil. The same issue involves God creating human beings whom God knew would choose to do evil. Why would God create such beings knowing what they would ultimately choose? One answer is that the creation of free willed beings was a good that God wanted to create. Can God create free willed beings that did not have the power to do evil? That is self-contradictory. If a being has the power to choose evil over good, then obviously God can’t prevent such a being from being able to do evil. You can’t have such a power and be prevented from having such a power at the same time. Even if God could create beings with the power to choose evil over good but nevertheless just never happened to choose evil, what would it mean for beings to be good or choose good if there wasn’t evil with which to contrast good behavior? How would honesty be a virtue if everyone were always honest? If telling the truth were a universal norm, why would someone choosing to tell the truth in a particular situation be particularly impressive? What good would loyalty be if no one ever betrayed trust? What would it mean for us to call someone “good” or an action “good” if everyone always engaged in that sort of action? The existence of moral evil may then be necessary (and in at least some contexts appears to be necessary) for the existence of moral good or morally laudatory behavior. Is it possible that God considered it good to create a world in which existed some beings who chose to do good on occasion and chose to do bad on occasion (or always or virtually always, as purportedly in the case of Satan) so that good actions (and good people) could be contrasted to bad actions (and bad people)? I don’t see why not, and you haven’t demonstrated why not. It’s not self-contradictory to suggest such, so it’s certainly logically possible.

How about probability? Is it probable or improbable that a purely good God would create such a universe, knowing that some of the beings he creates (including Satan) will choose evil, thereby creating a situation where good can be done that will be contrasted to the evil chosen by others? How can one judge what is probable or improbable for a god to do? Since we’re speaking about the Judaeo-Christian God, and hence a god within a monotheistic theology, then God is in a set of beings of which he is the only member (i.e. the set of gods). Hence, there are no other gods we know of from which we could make generalizations of behavior, and hence I don’t see what basis there is to judge that a god, were he to exist, would probably not make such a decision. We can’t exactly say, “Well, most other all-good gods would not behave that way, therefore it is implausible for this world to have a god who behaves in such a way”. Can we make inductive inferences from human beings? Aside from the fact that there is no universally agreed upon moral standard by which to judge all human behavior, there’s no reason to believe that our generalizations about what humans ought or ought not to do should be applicable to a supreme creator of the universe. This is particularly the case since the God of Christianity is stipulated within Christian doctrine as being the source of all that is good. As such, there is no other theoretical basis outside of God by which to judge his behavior. And there’s no reason to believe that the Christian God, were he to exist, is subject to moral standards outside of Christian doctrine. On what basis then could one conclude that creating such a universe was probably a bad thing for a god to do, and hence an all-good god, if such existed, would not do such a thing? What is this source of this “standard of good” that would judge the actions of a god creating the universe? I see no basis to make such a conclusion, and you haven’t provided any such basis.

As may be apparent by now, the above approach also addresses both the deductive and inductive Arguments from Evil. It’s entirely possible that creating beings that have the power to choose evil over good is itself a good thing (particularly if free will was itself a good thing, and/or people with the power to freely choose to obey God was a good thing) that outweighs any bad resulting from the evil such beings do. If so, then there is no logical contradiction with an all-good God creating such a universe. And since the particular god in question is the only such god, and furthermore is the source of all good, then I don’t see any basis to conclude that if a Christian god existed, that god would probably not create such a universe. And furthermore, I don’t see how it even makes sense to describe a universe with good but not evil. In addition to the above examples of honesty and loyalty, what would the good of compassion be without the evil of suffering? What would the good of perseverance be without any evil or suffering to endure? What would the good of not succumbing to temptation be without the existence of the temptation to do evil? What would the good of charity mean without need? Etc.

I see no reason to conclude that an all-good, even all-powerful God necessarily could accomplish any plan he had without the need for an evil “super-being”, or for that matter the need for any other being that can and does do evil? By most definitions of God’s omnipotence, God could only bring about states of affairs that are logically possible. Hence, if the existence of evil beings (including beings who may be very powerful, or perhaps weren’t essentially evil but did evil on occasion, like (at least) most humans) is necessary for some greater good that God wanted to accomplish, then God would have to create a universe in which such beings existed if he wanted to bring about that greater good. Is it logically possible for the existence of beings who can and do commit evil, including the existence of an evil super-being, to be necessary for some greater good? It’s not self-contradictory, so it’s at least logically possible. Is it improbable? Again, I see no basis on which to make any judgment on what an all-good, all-powerful god’s behavior would probably be like since, given that we’re limiting our discussion to the monotheistic Judaeo-Christian god, there is no other god or gods about whom we can accumulate behavioral evidence in order to make inductive conclusions about how a particular god would or would not behave. Hence, we have no basis to conclude that the existence of an evil super-being (or any other being that can and does do evil) is not necessary for some greater good God wishes to bring about.

Why didn’t God immediately destroy or contain Satan? An answer could follow the same analysis as above. It’s possible, isn’t it, that Satan’s having the freedom to do the evil he does and has done was logically necessary for some greater good that God wanted to achieve, such as giving people the option to choose good over evil? Why would that not be possible? Why would it be improbable? Does that mean that God allows evil? Of course. So what? Does that mean that God is an accomplice to evil? No. Allowing evil does not make one an accomplice to it. Each of us can do more to prevent evils in the world, but that doesn’t make us accomplices to the evils that we do not prevent. President Bush could simply drop nuclear bombs on North Korea’s capital, thus precluding the North Korean dictatorship from continuing to do evil. Does the fact that President Bush (or any president) declines to do so entail that our president is an accomplice to the evil done by the North Korean dictatorship? Absolutely not. Or, we could reduce a lot of crime if we executed every criminal convicted of a violent crime (it would at least prevent them from committing more crimes). Does society’s failure to do so mean that society is partially morally responsible for the crimes of criminals who have served their sentences, gone back on the street, and then committed more crimes? No. One might be tempted to try to distinguish the above cases by arguing that the actions described above to prevent evils are more evil themselves, which is why we would disapprove of them. But that’s just the point. We wouldn’t approve of actions like the above because they violate greater principles. In other words, allowing evil is sometimes justified in service of greater goods. Similarly, it’s entirely plausible that God allowing evils is necessary for a greater good. At least, you haven’t given a reason to believe that it’s implausible. One is only morally responsible for the evil one commits or contributes to committing. We’ve in fact based our criminal law code on such a moral principle. People aren’t held culpable for behavior they simply allowed. Does the fact that God created beings that he allows to commit evil mean that God is morally responsible (at least in part) for the evil committed? No. God is not morally responsible for the free actions his creations commit, any more than the fact that Hitler’s parents created Hitler entail that Hitler’s parents are partially morally responsible for the evils Hitler freely committed. For that matter, does the fact that parents produce children mean that all parents (and grandparents, and great grandparents) are partially morally responsible for the evils done by their children (or grandchildren, etc.)? No. One might distinguish God from parents and grandparents by the fact that parents and grandparents can’t foresee the future actions of their offspring. To that, I would refer to my earlier analysis. If the existence of beings that choose to do evil is logically necessary for some greater good, then it is ultimately good for God to create a world in which beings (such as Satan) do evil. Hence, even though God foresees such actions, the occurrence of such actions can logically be necessary for a greater good. Furthermore, parents can and do foresee their children doing some moral wrongs at some points in their lives. So the evils done by one’s children aren’t completely unforeseeable. But that still doesn’t make parents morally responsible for the evils freely committed by their children. Or is a parent negligent if the parent doesn’t prevent his/her children from ever doing anything wrong? No. Allowing the freedom of children to commit error and wrong is necessary for a greater good, for example a child’s moral education and the child’s development of maturity and responsibility. So if it’s sometimes necessary for us humans in order for a greater good to come about, why couldn’t it possibly be logically necessary for God? And if it’s logically necessary for a greater good, then even an omnipotent God must allow it in order to bring about that greater good, since even an omnipotent God can’t violate the fundamental laws of logic.

Why isn’t Satan free to do whatever he wants? Well, the answer to that requires the answers to two questions: 1. Does Satan have the power to do whatever he wants? (and as a corollary question: What are Satan’s powers?); and 2. Does God allow Satan to do whatever he wants? (and as a corollary question: What does God allow Satan to do?). We really have little to no information by which to make an educated answer to either question, and hence the issue is at best inconclusive. However, if, as my above analysis suggests, the existence of Satan and the allowance of his actions is necessary for some greater good that God wants to bring about, then Satan is acting within God’s ultimate plan. If so, then it’s certainly possible that God restricts the power of Satan to the extent necessary to bring about God’s plan (i.e. to bring about a greater good). Is it improbable? See above for the issue of God’s probable behavior.

Why does it not make any sense, as you say, for God to allow Satan to act surreptitiously, particularly if doing so is necessary for a greater good? To say so assumes that it would make more sense for God’s ultimate plans if God allowed Satan to act overtly. Yet you never defend such an assumption, which admittedly would be extremely difficult to do since we can’t be at all sure what God’s ultimate plans are. Such an assumption is certainly not necessarily true. Is it probably true (once again with probability)? On what basis could you make such a claim? Why would it be probably the case that God’s plan (whatever it is) would more likely include allowing Satan to act overtly, rather than surreptitiously? Perhaps Satan acting overtly would affect human free will in some way contrary to God’s plan. Similar to God acting overtly in the world might be contrary to God’s ultimate plan (e.g. if God were to act overtly, then only self-delusional people would be likely to reject God, and God wants a situation where everyone freely chooses good over evil)? If Satan acting surreptitiously is necessary for a greater good, then God limiting Satan’s power to the ability to only act surreptitiously makes perfect sense. Why wouldn’t it?

One might object that I’m relying on a lot of “maybes” and “perhapses’” and “possibilities” without stating and defending the actual reasons for God crating Satan and allowing him to do evil surreptitiously, etc. First of all, I cannot presume to know the reasons behind any action of a free willed being like God, assuming God exists. But my failure to be certain of the motivations of God is no more evidence against God’s existence than the fact that I can’t be sure of any human’s motivations counts as evidence against the existence of any particular person.

Furthermore, I really have to do is show that there’s no reason to believe that there’s no good reason for God acting in ways that he apparently acts, if he exists. You’ve made the assertion that certain states of affairs that actually exist are inconsistent with the existence of an actual Satan. The burden of proof is on the proponent of an argument. It’s your burden to demonstrate why the existence of certain states of affairs are inconsistent with the existence of Satan, or that certain elements involved in the doctrine of Satan are unlikely or impossible. So it’s your obligation to demonstrate why, not my obligation to demonstrate why God would allow certain states of affairs. All I have to do is argue that there’s no reason to accept your premises as necessarily or probably true. If I have, then your argument fails. That doesn’t mean that I’ve proven that Satan exists (like I stated at the beginning – I don’t even feel any requirement to believe in a literal Satan, even as a Christian). It just means that I’ve demonstrated (if I’ve been successful) that there’s no good reason for anyone to accept your arguments as sound.

You make an invalid inference in the following situation: Responding to a claim by Hugh Ross that “Satan is not allowed to tempt us more than we are capable of withstanding”, you infer that that means that “nobody is ever successfully tempted by Satan, right? If they are, then by definition, they have been tempted more than they can withstand, right?” Wrong. That’s an invalid inference. People succumbing to temptation doesn’t entail that they had to succumb. It just means that they did. All Ross’ claim means is that if people are successfully tempted by Satan, then they could have withstood Satan’s temptation, but didn’t. That in fact is more consistent with the idea of free will then the idea of Satan tempting us more than we can withstand.

The idea that we can withstand any temptation from Satan doesn’t entail that Satan and God are always in a dialogue concerning what temptations God allows Satan to produce at any given moment. If God gives humans an inbuilt power to withstand any temptation Satan throws at us, then there would be no need for the ongoing discussion between Satan and God that you suggest. And even if it did, so what? You simply assume that such a concept is absurd. On what basis do you conclude what is and what isn’t absurd for God to do, other than logical absurdity (e.g. God can’t do the logically impossible)?

10.

Satan having supernatural powers is not at all per se inconsistent with our having the free will to resist Satan’s temptations. The only supernatural power that Satan could have that would interfere with our free will would be powers over our will directly. But there’s no reason to believe that Satan has such supernatural powers. I don’t see why a power to influence people being per se “supernatural” is any more inconsistent with free will than a “natural” power to influence us would be inconsistent with free will. Say that Satan “supernaturally” causes my car to stall in the Red Light District, so that I am forced to get out and walk by hookers and drug dealers, tempting me with their services. Does that entail that I don’t have the free will to resist the temptations Satan has arranged for me to face? No. Why should anyone believe otherwise? Satan acting supernaturally just means that Satan is not acting within the parameters of nature. That, in itself, gives us no reason to believe that such action is necessarily compelling or inconsistent with our free will.

11.

As to your fossil example, you’re right that most Christians don’t believe that Satan has created fossils to fool us. Your argument on this point assumes that Satan has the power to make us unsure of anything we discover, but you’ve given us no reason to believe that Satan, if he exists, has such powers. It’s entirely possible that God requires us to be able to trust the empirical evidence we discover. It’s certainly necessary for inductive reasoning to be useful, and inductive reasoning appears necessary for our survival. How can we make any survival dependent decision unless we could judge that our decision was most likely to promote our survival? If we couldn’t trust empirical evidence, and hence couldn’t trust inductive reasoning, then we couldn’t trust any of our judgments being survival maximizing. Hence, it’s entirely reasonable that God would prevent Satan from having the power to make us doubt the truth of any of our empirical discoveries, in order to ensure our survival.

12.

Does Satan know if God is omnipotent? Suppose he knows now. Why would he do evil if he knew God would ultimately condemn him? Well, as one possibility, if he knows that he will ultimately be condemned for his initial rebellion against God, then perhaps he knows that he has nothing to lose now, like a criminal who knows that eventually he will be executed for crimes he already has committed but is nevertheless given a limited time of freedom until his execution. It’s no stretch of the imagination to imagine such a criminal doing all sorts of evil (or whatever self-serving reason he has) in the meantime, knowing that there’s not much worse the authorities can do to him than what is ultimately in store for him anyway.

If Satan knew that condemnation would be his ultimate destiny, why rebel in the first place? Well, is it possible for Satan to believe that he was powerful enough to overpower God? Obviously not if he was fully convinced of God’s omnipotence. But was he? There’s no reason nor evidence in the Bible to believe he (or his accomplices) did know, or believe that they weren’t deluded into thinking they could overcome God’s power. Since you’re entertaining the standard story of Satan seriously for the purposes of attacking its credibility, then who knows the “politics” that was going on in the spiritual world of God and the angels. In our world, we know of many instances of large numbers of people engaging in very foolish endeavors for all sorts of reasons.

13.

I’ve already addressed one possibility as to why God reveals himself in only surreptitious ways (or if ever overtly, only periodically through history). But aside from that, your question here, and your overall approach, is an approach that I find skeptics engage in frequently but, I must say, is entirely fallacious. The assumption appears to be that unless a theist or Christian can provide an acceptable answer to questions of why God supposedly acts in such and such a way, then there probably is no good reason, and hence God probably doesn’t exist. This is the fallacy known as an argument to ignorance (or “argumentum ad ignorantiam). From The Skeptic’s Dictionary: “The argument to ignorance is a logical fallacy of irrelevance occurring when one claims that something is true only because it hasn't been proved false, or that something is false only because it has not been proved true. A claim's truth or falsity depends upon supporting or refuting evidence to the claim, not the lack of support for a contrary or contradictory claim.” Hence, even if a theist or Christian were to fail to demonstrate a good reason why God acted in some way that God is purported to act in Christian theology, that doesn’t entail that there is no good reason for God to act in that way. The burden is on you to demonstrate why God, if he existed, wouldn’t act in that way.

14.

Is there free will in Heaven? Maybe, maybe not. Either possibility seems consistent with Christian theology to me. If there isn’t free will, then does that mean that free will isn’t a good thing then? No. It could be that free will was necessary for a finite period of time in our individual lives, a time in which we make decisions as to whether or not we will love and obey God. Once we make such a decision and pass from this earth, it could be that God then rewards our ultimate decision with eternal coexistence with him in Heaven in ultimate joy and peace (or otherwise for nonbelievers), and that free will is no longer necessary (having served God’s purpose for us). Or, free will could exist in Heaven and yet since there is no want and we are fully in God’s presence. Hence the “saved” simply don’t ever have reason to ever sin, and never do. Or, humans in Heaven could have free will, but have no good reason to sin, particularly since they’re living in bliss with empowered willpower, without want and in the presence of God. Nevertheless humans in this last scenario occasionally sin, but such sin is by necessity minor (since no one can be harmed) and immediately forgiven. Any of these possibilities seem consistent with Christian theology.

I believe that addresses all of your arguments. I welcome responses to my points, but I would appreciate the chance to respond to the responses. Thanks.

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