Extraordinary Events -- Extraordinary Evidence?
Do Extraordinary Events Require Extraordinary Evidence?: A Rebuttal to G. Brady Lenardos
(Third Edition, April 2006)
By Paul Jacobsen
(Third Edition, April 2006)
By Paul Jacobsen
Carl Sagan once said, "I believe that the extraordinary should be pursued. But extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." In the article, "Do Extraordinary Events Require Extraordinary Evidence?" (http://ucapologetics.com/extraord.htm) G. Brady Lenardos argues that extraordinary events should be subject to the same standards of evidence as ordinary events. The goal of this paper is to argue the counter-position, that Sagan is correct and extraordinary claims do indeed require extraordinary evidence.
Before I continue, I would like to introduce myself. I am an "amateur" skeptic, meaning I have not had any significant formal study in these topics, aside from a few courses in history and logic--not enough to claim special expertise. So, perhaps I am out of my field in this discussion, but I ask the reader to withhold judgment on that until they have finished reading my arguments.
Lenardos argues that if a skeptic asks for absolute proof of the resurrection, he or she is asking for the impossible. Lenardos is completely correct--asking for absolute proof is indeed impossible. Lenardos also claims that one skeptic had asked for a videotape, which he says is an unreasonable request. I can concur with Lenardos here as well. So what exactly would be a reasonable request for evidence? I agree that it is a good question, which I want to explore here.
Lenardos asks for an objective measure for how to validate extraordinary events, and the criterion must be consistent with methods used in historical research. This sounds at reasonable at first blush, except there is no such thing as "objective" measure in history. History is a subjective study. I have another paper discussing this issue at more length, Historical Methods: Lenardos' Framing the Misdirection.
Of course history isn't entirely subjective, there are objective aspects to history. The problem is, it is partially objective and partially subjective, and they are intertwined. I'd like to give an example of the difficulty of separating the objective from the subjective. Are Ford's better than Chevy's? Most of us would say that is a subjective call. For one person, a Ford may be better, but for another, a Chevy may be better. But a Ford fan might get out statistics on reliability and horsepower and maintenance and try to make a claim that Ford's are objectively better than Chevy's. But, it is not likely that in every objective category, Ford's are always better or Chevy's. Perhaps one brand has better reliability statistics, while the other has better safety statistics. So, which is better? It is subjective isn't it? The point being, many things have objective and subjective components and completely separating them is not always possible.
Now, I'd like to add another analogy. Say there are these three friends, I'll call them Gus, Buddy, and Ralph. These guys have been long-time friends, and they've all been long-time skeptics of alien abductions. One day, Gus reports that--much to his own surprise--he was abducted by aliens. Now suppose, upon hearing this, Buddy responds, "I'm sure you must believe that happened, but there must be another explanation. The idea that aliens would travel light-years across space to do weird experiments on people just isn't plausible." On the other hand, Ralph responds, "I've always been skeptical of these things, but I suppose it may be only because never before has anybody that I trust has had such an experience. I trust you, Gus, so I believe you were abducted." There is at least some amount of rationality to both positions. Buddy bases his continued skepticism upon the same reasons he was skeptical before Gus's reported event. Ralph bases his diminished skepticism on his knowledge that Gus is generally trustworthy. I don't think we can say either of the responses is totally off base. The reason I bring this analogy up is, if some people require stronger evidence to believe in the hard-to-believe than another person, that doesn't mean the person wanting stronger evidence is unreasonable. Some people simply require stronger evidence than others do, and that's just the way it is. There just isn't any objective formula to plug in the facts of Gus being generally reliable, but alien abductions are fundamentally improbable and come up with an exact answer as to whether to believe or disbelieve Gus.
Lenardos claims, "the Christian position only asks that we use the same reasoning and rational thought that we use to derive what are considered good conclusions in historical investigation, and apply those same means and methods to the New Testament and the resurrection of Jesus." Is this really what the Christian position is? Lets say, for the sake of argument, that there is roughly the same amount of evidence for the Resurrection as there is for Constantine having once been Emperor of Rome. (This is absolutely NOT true, but just for the sake of argument..) So, assuming this is true, then, by Lenardos' logic, we should consider them both equally proved. Now, I don't have any particular reason to doubt that Constantine was indeed Emperor of Rome. But, would I bet my soul on it? (Assuming that souls exist at all...) Would Lenardos bet his eternal soul on it? Would Lenardos get up on Sunday mornings, and go to church and give his confession, "I believe that Constantine was Emperor of Rome, so help me God." Would Lenardos consider it a reasonable criterion of eternal salvation to be whether someone has correctly concluded that Constantine was indeed Emperor of Rome? If I were to say, "you know, I don't think Constantine ever was Emperor," I might be said to be foolish, but would I deserve eternal punishment for it? My point of course is simply that Christians by no means treat the Resurrection like any other alleged historical event.
The Christian position is not that I should merely be convinced by a preponderance of evidence of the Resurrection--the Christian position is that I should be convinced to the point of betting my eternal soul on it. But if he won't bet his eternal soul that Constantine was Emperor of Rome, why should I bet my soul on whether or not Jesus was raised from the dead? Also, given that Lenardos admitted that absolute proof is impossible, doesn't this, by itself, show that betting one's eternal soul on in to be rather absurd? If I asked him to bet his soul on anything else, and confessed that what I was asking him to bet it on was impossible to absolutely prove, wouldn't he say I was crazy? So why does God insist people "bet their souls" on whether or not some specific event happened 2,000 years ago? Even if it really did happen, why is it a terrible crime for me to erroneously conclude otherwise?
Lenardos says that the skeptic asking for "extraordinary evidence" is special pleading. This sounds reasonable, but is it? Lets say Emperor Constantine was reported to have jumped over the moon. Does Lenardos honestly believe that we should use the same means to determine that he jumped over the moon that we use to determine that he was emperor? If we find, say, a thousand references to Constantine having been emperor in ancient documents, so we conclude that Constantine was probably emperor. If we find a thousand references to his having jumped over the moon in ancient documents, should we also conclude that he did so? I say no, we should not.
The topic has been discussed on the Internet Infidels forum. Perhaps I'll be being redundant, but there was an analogy posted by "bd-from-kg" that is so good, that I'd like to borrow it:
Before I continue, I would like to introduce myself. I am an "amateur" skeptic, meaning I have not had any significant formal study in these topics, aside from a few courses in history and logic--not enough to claim special expertise. So, perhaps I am out of my field in this discussion, but I ask the reader to withhold judgment on that until they have finished reading my arguments.
Lenardos argues that if a skeptic asks for absolute proof of the resurrection, he or she is asking for the impossible. Lenardos is completely correct--asking for absolute proof is indeed impossible. Lenardos also claims that one skeptic had asked for a videotape, which he says is an unreasonable request. I can concur with Lenardos here as well. So what exactly would be a reasonable request for evidence? I agree that it is a good question, which I want to explore here.
Lenardos asks for an objective measure for how to validate extraordinary events, and the criterion must be consistent with methods used in historical research. This sounds at reasonable at first blush, except there is no such thing as "objective" measure in history. History is a subjective study. I have another paper discussing this issue at more length, Historical Methods: Lenardos' Framing the Misdirection.
Of course history isn't entirely subjective, there are objective aspects to history. The problem is, it is partially objective and partially subjective, and they are intertwined. I'd like to give an example of the difficulty of separating the objective from the subjective. Are Ford's better than Chevy's? Most of us would say that is a subjective call. For one person, a Ford may be better, but for another, a Chevy may be better. But a Ford fan might get out statistics on reliability and horsepower and maintenance and try to make a claim that Ford's are objectively better than Chevy's. But, it is not likely that in every objective category, Ford's are always better or Chevy's. Perhaps one brand has better reliability statistics, while the other has better safety statistics. So, which is better? It is subjective isn't it? The point being, many things have objective and subjective components and completely separating them is not always possible.
Now, I'd like to add another analogy. Say there are these three friends, I'll call them Gus, Buddy, and Ralph. These guys have been long-time friends, and they've all been long-time skeptics of alien abductions. One day, Gus reports that--much to his own surprise--he was abducted by aliens. Now suppose, upon hearing this, Buddy responds, "I'm sure you must believe that happened, but there must be another explanation. The idea that aliens would travel light-years across space to do weird experiments on people just isn't plausible." On the other hand, Ralph responds, "I've always been skeptical of these things, but I suppose it may be only because never before has anybody that I trust has had such an experience. I trust you, Gus, so I believe you were abducted." There is at least some amount of rationality to both positions. Buddy bases his continued skepticism upon the same reasons he was skeptical before Gus's reported event. Ralph bases his diminished skepticism on his knowledge that Gus is generally trustworthy. I don't think we can say either of the responses is totally off base. The reason I bring this analogy up is, if some people require stronger evidence to believe in the hard-to-believe than another person, that doesn't mean the person wanting stronger evidence is unreasonable. Some people simply require stronger evidence than others do, and that's just the way it is. There just isn't any objective formula to plug in the facts of Gus being generally reliable, but alien abductions are fundamentally improbable and come up with an exact answer as to whether to believe or disbelieve Gus.
Lenardos claims, "the Christian position only asks that we use the same reasoning and rational thought that we use to derive what are considered good conclusions in historical investigation, and apply those same means and methods to the New Testament and the resurrection of Jesus." Is this really what the Christian position is? Lets say, for the sake of argument, that there is roughly the same amount of evidence for the Resurrection as there is for Constantine having once been Emperor of Rome. (This is absolutely NOT true, but just for the sake of argument..) So, assuming this is true, then, by Lenardos' logic, we should consider them both equally proved. Now, I don't have any particular reason to doubt that Constantine was indeed Emperor of Rome. But, would I bet my soul on it? (Assuming that souls exist at all...) Would Lenardos bet his eternal soul on it? Would Lenardos get up on Sunday mornings, and go to church and give his confession, "I believe that Constantine was Emperor of Rome, so help me God." Would Lenardos consider it a reasonable criterion of eternal salvation to be whether someone has correctly concluded that Constantine was indeed Emperor of Rome? If I were to say, "you know, I don't think Constantine ever was Emperor," I might be said to be foolish, but would I deserve eternal punishment for it? My point of course is simply that Christians by no means treat the Resurrection like any other alleged historical event.
The Christian position is not that I should merely be convinced by a preponderance of evidence of the Resurrection--the Christian position is that I should be convinced to the point of betting my eternal soul on it. But if he won't bet his eternal soul that Constantine was Emperor of Rome, why should I bet my soul on whether or not Jesus was raised from the dead? Also, given that Lenardos admitted that absolute proof is impossible, doesn't this, by itself, show that betting one's eternal soul on in to be rather absurd? If I asked him to bet his soul on anything else, and confessed that what I was asking him to bet it on was impossible to absolutely prove, wouldn't he say I was crazy? So why does God insist people "bet their souls" on whether or not some specific event happened 2,000 years ago? Even if it really did happen, why is it a terrible crime for me to erroneously conclude otherwise?
Lenardos says that the skeptic asking for "extraordinary evidence" is special pleading. This sounds reasonable, but is it? Lets say Emperor Constantine was reported to have jumped over the moon. Does Lenardos honestly believe that we should use the same means to determine that he jumped over the moon that we use to determine that he was emperor? If we find, say, a thousand references to Constantine having been emperor in ancient documents, so we conclude that Constantine was probably emperor. If we find a thousand references to his having jumped over the moon in ancient documents, should we also conclude that he did so? I say no, we should not.
The topic has been discussed on the Internet Infidels forum. Perhaps I'll be being redundant, but there was an analogy posted by "bd-from-kg" that is so good, that I'd like to borrow it:
Suppose that it’s reported that Mustaph (who is a complete unknown from Uzbekistan) has been clocked running the mile in four minutes flat. We’d be somewhat skeptical, but what the heck, this has been done a good many times by now. But now consider the following series of possible claims:
(1) Mustaph ran the mile in 4:00. (2) Mustaph ran the mile in 3:59. (3) Mustaph ran the mile in 3:58. ... (61) Mustaph ran the mile in 3:00. ... (181) Mustaph ran the mile in 1:00. ... (240) Mustaph ran the mile in one second. (241) Mustaph ran the mile in one second and in the process ran through a solid wall without damaging it. (242) Mustaph ran the mile in one second and in the process ran through a solid wall without damaging it, and afterwards ascended bodily into Heaven. (243) Mustaph ran the mile in one second and in the process ran through a solid wall without damaging it, and afterwards ascended bodily into Heaven, and at the time had been dead and buried for several days. At some point in this series, I trust that your skeptical instincts would be aroused. In fact, I suspect that this would happen well before you reached claim 243; in fact, well before the feat in question would plainly require miraculous intervention. Now what Christians want to do is to agree that claim 61, for example, is highly implausible, but that claim 243 is less implausible because it plainly requires miraculous intervention. I submit that any rational person will regard each claim in this list (after the first) as less plausible than the preceding one. There is not some point at which the claims suddenly become more plausible because they would plainly violate some known natural law. In other words: extraordinary events require extraordinary evidence. The more extraordinary they are, the more evidence is required to justify rational belief. |
The next topic I'd like to discuss is the question, what exactly is an "extraordinary" event? Is it, "Mustaph ran the mile in three minutes," or is it, "Mustaph ran the mile in one second while having been dead for three days"? A three-minute mile might "extraordinary" in one sense, but it still might be humanly possible. On the other hand, a one-second mile while dead clearly is not. Likewise, the Resurrection is not humanly possible. So, we really have two different classes of "extraordinary events". We have events that seem "extraordinary" but are not necessarily supernatural. Then we have supernatural events. When speaking of the Resurrection, we are talking specifically about supernatural extraordinary events. So, now I want to discuss the topic of validating supernatural events.
Lenardos says that if a skeptic says a "different kind" of evidence is needed compared to validating ordinary events, then the skeptic should have to explain just exactly what "different kind" would be needed. Which brings up an interesting point. All we humans have for validating events are our naturalistic senses. That's all we got. Of course we do have ways of finding things that are beyond our senses. Such as we can find radio waves even though they are beyond our senses. But the way we find them is to build naturalistic devices that can detect them and present them to our senses. For example, a radio converts radio waves to sound. Supernatural events, by their definition are beyond our senses, and even beyond measurement and quantification by naturalistic devices. Therefore, validation of supernatural events requires a "different kind" of validation--it requires supernatural validation--which we fundamentally just don't have!
I suspect that Lenardos would object to my assertion that supernatural events are beyond our senses. Supernatural events, at least those that would concern us, are presumably those that somehow interact with our natural universe. For example, if Jesus was raised from the dead, he then interacted with people after his death. But that is not what I mean. I mean the force that brought Jesus back to life is immeasurable. Naturalistic forces, such as gravity, are detectable and measurable with naturalist devices. Supernatural forces are not detectable or measurable. Which means all evidence in favor of a supernatural event is always circumstantial. Even if what is presented in the Bible is completely accurate in the sense that witnesses did genuinely perceive the events as depicted, it is all circumstantial evidence. No direct evidence of what happened in Jesus' tomb exists. And in my view, circumstantial evidence is never adequate to validate supernatural events. And since circumstantial evidence is all that is possible to ever produce in favor of supernatural events, that means supernatural events are inherently not validatable.
I concede that there must be some point where a body of circumstantial evidence could be so great, that perhaps accepting that a supernatural event happened might be reasonable. Now I suspect Lenardos might jump in and say, "okay, now, tell me how high that pile of circumstantial evidence needs to be?" Well, I confess, that might seem like a valid question. But I suspect he wouldn't have a real great answer if I asked him, "how big of a pile of circumstantial evidence in favor of Constantine jumping over the moon would you need before you believed that happened?" I'm afraid that quantity of circumstantial evidence required to believe such things is hard to pin down... its subjective. And to demand a purely objective measure, as Lenardos has demanded, is to demand the impossible.
It seems the universe we live in must fit one of these three categories:
Lenardos says that if a skeptic says a "different kind" of evidence is needed compared to validating ordinary events, then the skeptic should have to explain just exactly what "different kind" would be needed. Which brings up an interesting point. All we humans have for validating events are our naturalistic senses. That's all we got. Of course we do have ways of finding things that are beyond our senses. Such as we can find radio waves even though they are beyond our senses. But the way we find them is to build naturalistic devices that can detect them and present them to our senses. For example, a radio converts radio waves to sound. Supernatural events, by their definition are beyond our senses, and even beyond measurement and quantification by naturalistic devices. Therefore, validation of supernatural events requires a "different kind" of validation--it requires supernatural validation--which we fundamentally just don't have!
I suspect that Lenardos would object to my assertion that supernatural events are beyond our senses. Supernatural events, at least those that would concern us, are presumably those that somehow interact with our natural universe. For example, if Jesus was raised from the dead, he then interacted with people after his death. But that is not what I mean. I mean the force that brought Jesus back to life is immeasurable. Naturalistic forces, such as gravity, are detectable and measurable with naturalist devices. Supernatural forces are not detectable or measurable. Which means all evidence in favor of a supernatural event is always circumstantial. Even if what is presented in the Bible is completely accurate in the sense that witnesses did genuinely perceive the events as depicted, it is all circumstantial evidence. No direct evidence of what happened in Jesus' tomb exists. And in my view, circumstantial evidence is never adequate to validate supernatural events. And since circumstantial evidence is all that is possible to ever produce in favor of supernatural events, that means supernatural events are inherently not validatable.
I concede that there must be some point where a body of circumstantial evidence could be so great, that perhaps accepting that a supernatural event happened might be reasonable. Now I suspect Lenardos might jump in and say, "okay, now, tell me how high that pile of circumstantial evidence needs to be?" Well, I confess, that might seem like a valid question. But I suspect he wouldn't have a real great answer if I asked him, "how big of a pile of circumstantial evidence in favor of Constantine jumping over the moon would you need before you believed that happened?" I'm afraid that quantity of circumstantial evidence required to believe such things is hard to pin down... its subjective. And to demand a purely objective measure, as Lenardos has demanded, is to demand the impossible.
It seems the universe we live in must fit one of these three categories:
- Supernatural events are commonplace.
- Supernatural events are rare, but happen.
- Supernatural events never happen at all.
Granted, the dividing line between category 1 and 2 is blurry--whether supernatural events are "rare" or "commonplace" is subjective. But I suspect most Christians would classify them as rare, and say that our universe fits category 2. But first, lets consider category 1: supernatural events are commonplace. Say for example that roads randomly disappear. Houses move to different continents. Tigers appear out of thin air and maul people on a regular basis. What would such a world be like? Such a world would be very difficult for people to live in. People, if they could survive at all, would probably need to develop a fatalistic attitude. "If I go to the store, I might not find my home again. I might run into a tiger. Well, I guess I'll just see what happens…"
There isn't much to say about category 3, if supernatural events don't happen at all, then that's the way it is. But, I argue that even if the universe fits category 2--that supernatural events happen but only rarely--it is reasonable to assume that instead the universe is of category 3; it is reasonable to assume there are no supernatural events. Day-to-day, we live our lives as if the world resembles category 3. When we leave home, we don't think, "what if my house gets teleported to Pluto while I'm away?" We just assume that it won't. Secondly, even if supernatural events do happen on rare occasion, we are fundamentally without the ability to validate them, and we can't do anything to prevent them or predict them. So our only reasonable course of action is to simply assume they do not happen.
Now, if supernatural events really do happen, I concede that the people who were party to the event could be very convinced it happened. But, should I--or any third-party--accept their testimony? From my perspective, I am fundamentally without any way to validate their testimony--I have no supernatural powers. Further, I cannot know if the people who were party to the event were mistaken, or lying. Or, perhaps a naturalist cause was simply not seen. It is even possible an undiscovered naturalist force could have been at work. From my perspective, these possibilities are always more likely than a supernatural explanation. Therefore, there is never any good reason for me to accept anybody else's testimony to a supernatural event. No doubt Lenardos would say I'm displaying a bias against supernatural events. Okay, so what? The point is, I believe I have shown it to be a reasonable bias, and no doubt a bias he likely even shares when discussing supernatural events purported by members of religions other than his own.
Similarly, in my "Emperor Constantine jumped over the moon analogy," even if I could produce a fair quantity of historical evidence that it happened, I doubt he would be convinced it really happened. I could then say, "see, you're just biased against the idea of jumping over the moon!" And he might respond, "yeah...and?"
I suppose I must conclude in a way, Lenardos is right. Supernatural events don't merely need "extraordinary" evidence, they need supernatural validation--validation that is fundamentally impossible for us naturalistic beings to produce. If supernatural events do happen, I am fundamentally incapable of validating it. Fortunately, all the evidence seems to point to the nonexistence of supernatural events. As far as I know, roads don't disappear at random. Houses don't teleport themselves to Pluto. Tigers don't materialize in thin air. Therefore, I conclude I am as rational to dismiss the Resurrection as Lenardos would be to dismiss my hypothetical claims that Emperor Constantine jumped over the moon. Neither of these events, as near as I can tell, have any greater or lesser probability of being true.
There isn't much to say about category 3, if supernatural events don't happen at all, then that's the way it is. But, I argue that even if the universe fits category 2--that supernatural events happen but only rarely--it is reasonable to assume that instead the universe is of category 3; it is reasonable to assume there are no supernatural events. Day-to-day, we live our lives as if the world resembles category 3. When we leave home, we don't think, "what if my house gets teleported to Pluto while I'm away?" We just assume that it won't. Secondly, even if supernatural events do happen on rare occasion, we are fundamentally without the ability to validate them, and we can't do anything to prevent them or predict them. So our only reasonable course of action is to simply assume they do not happen.
Now, if supernatural events really do happen, I concede that the people who were party to the event could be very convinced it happened. But, should I--or any third-party--accept their testimony? From my perspective, I am fundamentally without any way to validate their testimony--I have no supernatural powers. Further, I cannot know if the people who were party to the event were mistaken, or lying. Or, perhaps a naturalist cause was simply not seen. It is even possible an undiscovered naturalist force could have been at work. From my perspective, these possibilities are always more likely than a supernatural explanation. Therefore, there is never any good reason for me to accept anybody else's testimony to a supernatural event. No doubt Lenardos would say I'm displaying a bias against supernatural events. Okay, so what? The point is, I believe I have shown it to be a reasonable bias, and no doubt a bias he likely even shares when discussing supernatural events purported by members of religions other than his own.
Similarly, in my "Emperor Constantine jumped over the moon analogy," even if I could produce a fair quantity of historical evidence that it happened, I doubt he would be convinced it really happened. I could then say, "see, you're just biased against the idea of jumping over the moon!" And he might respond, "yeah...and?"
I suppose I must conclude in a way, Lenardos is right. Supernatural events don't merely need "extraordinary" evidence, they need supernatural validation--validation that is fundamentally impossible for us naturalistic beings to produce. If supernatural events do happen, I am fundamentally incapable of validating it. Fortunately, all the evidence seems to point to the nonexistence of supernatural events. As far as I know, roads don't disappear at random. Houses don't teleport themselves to Pluto. Tigers don't materialize in thin air. Therefore, I conclude I am as rational to dismiss the Resurrection as Lenardos would be to dismiss my hypothetical claims that Emperor Constantine jumped over the moon. Neither of these events, as near as I can tell, have any greater or lesser probability of being true.
After some prodding, I was able to convince Mr. Lenardos to engage with me in an e-mail debate over this subject. If interested in reading our debate, please go to the debate page:
G. Brady Lenardos Debate
G. Brady Lenardos Debate